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Abstract 
By adopting social exchange theory and the affect-infusion-model, we hypothesized that 
emotional intelligence (EI) would have an impact on three perceptions of trustworthiness – 
ability, integrity and benevolence – at the beginning of a relationship.  We also hypothesized that 
additional information would gradually displace EI in forming the above perceptions.  Our 
experimental results do not support the hypotheses that EI has an impact on the perceptions at the 
beginning of a relationship.  However, they support the hypothesis that additional information is 
significant in forming the perceptions of ability and integrity but not of benevolence.  Results 
also suggest that EI could significantly, yet negatively, affect the perception of benevolence 
when additional information is revealed.  Practical implications, limitations, and future research 
are then discussed. 
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Influence of Emotional Intelligence on 
Perceptions of Trustworthiness 
Emotional intelligence (EI) has attracted much attention since Goleman published his book 
“Emotional Intelligence” in 1995.  EI has been found to help people cope with stress (Zeidner, 
Matthews, & Roberts, 2006), live healthier lives (Ciarrochi & Blackledge, 2006; Salovey, 2006), 
and have better quality of social interactions (Lopes, Salovey, & Straus, 2007).  How to apply EI 
to workplace and leadership is also a topic for much literature (Goleman, 1998; George, 2000; 
Zhou & George, 2003; Caruso, Bienn, & Kornacki, 2006; Tim & Amanda, 2006).  Another topic 
that draws researchers’ interests is trust.  Trust has been found positively related to job 
performance and negatively related to counterproductive behaviors such as absenteeism or 
intentions to resign (Cunningham & MacGregor, 2000; Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007).  It has 
also been seen as an effective tool to counter the expectation of opportunistic behavior and to 
lower transaction costs (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003).   In fact, recent research has found 
that both trust and EI contribute to the performance of relationship managers in the banking 
industry (Heffernan, O'Neill, Travaglione, & Droulers, 2008). 
Is there then, any relationship between EI and trust?  What researches have agreed so far is 
that emotions can affect trust (Jones & George, 1998; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Colquitt et al., 
2007).   EI, which comprises skills such as acknowledging and managing emotions, is therefore 
considered a key to establish trust (Druskat & Wolff, 2001).   However, how EI can contribute to 
the formation of trust has been rarely explored.  It is still unknown whether a high-EI individual 
is more inclined to trust or whether a high-EI individual is better equipped to project a 
trustworthy image or both.  In this paper we will investigate the relationship between 
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trustworthiness and EI first.  We try to develop a mechanism to explain the relationship between 
EI and trustworthiness by the inclusion of social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) and the affect-
infusion model (Forgas, 1995).  From this mechanism we propose a number of hypotheses.  
These hypotheses are then tested by data collected through an experiment.  The final results will 
be discussed in detail.    
Social Exchange Theory 
Blau (1964)’s social exchange theory explains how trust between two people evolves.  
Social exchange is defined as an individual’s voluntary actions that are motivated by the returns 
he or she expects to elicit from others.  The exchange is a slow process and a person initiates this 
process by offering small favors to another individual.  Such small favors may induce an 
obligation to the latter party to return some favors.  If the latter party returns what the first party 
has expected, the latter party demonstrates trustworthiness.  Further, trust can then be reinforced 
through regular discharge of obligation and gradual expansion of exchanges over time (Whitener, 
Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). 
To keep the social exchange process continuing, one needs to overcome a number of 
uncertainties which do not exist in an economic exchange transaction.  In an economic exchange 
transaction, both parties normally stipulate in advance of the transaction their individual rights 
and obligations, time-frame of fulfillment, as well as the consequences of violation.  However, 
all these items remain vague to each party in a social exchange transaction.  In a social exchange 
transaction, it is not easy for one to know what constitutes an appropriate and equitable return to 
a received favor.   Appropriateness and equity can only be judged in the eyes of the initiator 
(Blau, 1964).  Although there might be some commonly accepted practice for returning favors, 
for example, a supervisor offers a meal for staff members who have done extra work, individual 
difference in response to a return may still exist.  To tackle individual difference, especially at an 
 
Influences of Emotional Intelligence on     3 
 
early stage of a relationship in which no prior record can serve as a guideline, one needs to 
discover the other party’s intentions through other clues. 
Clues can come from a number of non-verbal behaviors, which include head-nodding, eye-
contact, gestures, tone and voice, etc (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002).  These behaviors might be a 
manifestation of a person’s internal emotional state such as happiness, apathy, frustration or 
poignancy.  The ability to establish the link between emotional states and behaviors will give a 
person a better chance of discharging his or her obligations under a social exchange transaction, 
and thus exhibiting his or her trustworthiness (Blau, 1964). 
The Affect Infusion Model 
Trustworthiness, on the other hand, can be viewed as a judgment one needs to make about 
another party in a relationship.   A judgment can be formed, according to Forgas’s (1995) affect-
infusion-model, by adopting one of four strategies: direct access, motivated processing, heuristic 
processing and substantive processing.  Two of these four strategies are influenced by affects, 
which include both moods and emotions, but the other two are not.  Affects, for example, have 
little role to play in forming a judgment under a direct access strategy.  A direct-access strategy 
means that a person reaches a judgment based on his or her pre-existing and stored evaluations of 
the latter party.  This strategy requires little elaboration (Forgas & George, 2001).  For example, 
it is unlikely for a secretary to ruminate his or her boss’s trustworthiness after working together 
for ten years.   Another strategy, motivated-processing, is used when a person is under strong 
motivational pressure to achieve a particular outcome.  Such motivational pressure and 
achievement desire are so strong that he or she will not allow his or her affective state to 
influence his or her judgment.  An example is that an interviewee is unlikely to allow his or her 
mood to color his or her judgment during a job interview. 
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The remaining two strategies, however, are disturbed by a person’s moods and emotions.  
A heuristic-processing strategy means that a person simply deduces his or her judgment from his 
or her current affective state (George, 2000).  When he or she feels good, his or her judgment 
tends to be positive and vice versa.   However, it has been argued that in a complex 
organizational context, this strategy is seldom adopted (Forgas & George, 2001).  If uncertain 
and unpredictable social encounters are prevalent, one may adopt a substantive-processing 
strategy (Forgas & Wyland, 2006).  Substantive-processing means that an individual needs to 
elaborate extensively and during the elaboration process affect is likely to infuse into the 
judgment.  For example, when a new manager negotiates with the head of other department 
about the division of responsibility in a project, the new manager might not possess enough 
information about the other party’s trustworthiness.  Since the decision is important, he or she 
might try to make a best conjecture based on the association of information on hand with his or 
her own experiences.   Positive experiences are then more likely to be retrieved and interpreted 
favorably when he or she is in good moods, and vice versa.     
Three of the above four strategies are claimed to be related to the judgment of trust: 
heuristic-processing, substantive-processing and direct-access (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005).  One 
might adopt a heuristic-processing strategy or a substantive-processing strategy to appraise a 
target person’s trustworthiness when the latter party is a complete stranger.  Whichever strategy 
is chosen, the decision will be influenced by one’s affective state.  However, as one gets to know 
a target person better, judgment will be made through direct-access strategy, in which affects 
play little role. 
Emotional Intelligence 
The affect-infusion model indicates that moods affect an individual’s judgment 
subconsciously under heuristic or substantive-processing strategy.  Consequently, it is reasonable 
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to postulate that an individual may alter others’ judgments through recognizing and skillfully 
handling their emotions and moods (George, 2000; Forgas & George, 2001; Forgas & Wyland, 
2006).  High-EI people, some argue, normally possess such ability (Goleman, 1995; Caruso et al., 
2006; Greenberg, Greenberg, & Antonucci, 2007).  This leads us to believe that the presence of 
high-EI individuals might speed up the formation of a trustful relationship. 
However, what constitutes EI has still been subjected to disputes.  At present, there are 
different models and measures of EI.  One common way to categorize EI is the division between 
ability-based EI (Mayer & Salovey, 2007) and trait-based EI (Bar-On, 2000; Goleman, 2000; 
Petrides, Pita, & Kokkinaki, 2007).   The ability-based model is adopted in this paper for three 
reasons.  First, previous researches have shown that trait-based EI, unlike ability-based EI, has 
excessive overlap with standard personality traits such as the Five-Factor Model (Brackett & 
Geher, 2006; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2008; Zeidner, Roberts, & Matthews, 2008).  By 
adopting a trait-based model, it will then be difficult to identify what eventually contributes to 
the final outcomes: personality or emotional skills.  Second, other research has pointed out that 
trait-based EI is too encompassing (Locke, 2005).  For example, Goleman has already included 
trustworthiness under the component of self-management within his EI model (Goleman, 2000).    
Why such a component has been included in the EI model in the first place is questionable 
(Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2008).  The ability-based model, on the other hand, restricts itself to 
only emotions and intelligence-related aspects.  It is therefore more meaningful to investigate 
whether the relationship between emotional abilities and trustworthiness really exists than to 
simply assume them as a single construct.  Third, research has also indicated that the self-report 
questionnaire used by trait-based models is more vulnerable to faking than is the expert and 
general-consensus based questionnaire used by the ability-based model (Day & Carroll, 2008).  
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Consequently, results will be more reliable if the measurement itself is less likely to be subjected 
to manipulations. 
The ability-based model of EI, as defined by Mayer & Salovey (2007), involves four 
abilities: (1) the ability to accurately perceive and express emotions; (2) the ability to generate 
feelings to assist thinking; (3) the ability to understand emotions and their progression; and (4) 
the ability to regulate and manage emotions.  Here, the term emotion is equivalent to the term 
affect, which includes both moods and emotions, used in the affect infusion model (Forgas, 
1995). 
These abilities have been found helpful in certain organizational settings.  For example, EI 
has been found to be positively correlated with organizational commitment and conflict 
resolution (Cartwright & Pappas, 2008).  Additionally, Carmeli & Josman (2006) have discerned 
that supervisors’ ratings of employees’ altruism are positively related to employees’ EI.  It is 
likely that organizational commitment, conflict resolution, and altruism might have some 
connection with trust. 
Trustworthiness 
The formation of a trust relationship depends both on a trustor’s tendency to trust and the 
trustworthiness of a trustee.  The two are nonetheless interrelated.  If a trustee is not regarded as 
trustworthy, a trustor’s tendency to trust will be low.  What then, makes a trustor believe that a 
trustee is trustworthy?  Butler (1991) has discovered ten conditions of trustworthiness:  
availability, competence, consistency, discreetness, fairness, integrity, loyalty, openness, promise 
fulfillment, and receptivity.  These ten conditions have later been combined into three 
antecedents of trust: ability, integrity and benevolence by Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman (1995).    
Since then, these three antecedents of trust have been widely adopted in trust literature (Gill, 
Boies, Finegan, & McNally, 2005).  Indeed, later empirical researches have shown that ability, 
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benevolence and integrity are all significantly and positively related to trust (Mayer & Gavin, 
2005; Clark & Payne, 2006).   
Nevertheless, all the above suggest that trustworthiness can be ascertained only after all the 
above behaviors become apparent (Whitener et al., 1998).  If this is the case, trust between two 
parties can only be created after a certain period of time.  However, it has been discovered that 
even before the actual behaviors are exhibited, a mere display of trustworthy signals could 
enhance the image of trustworthiness. For example, the simple inclusion of a statement of 
privacy policy or unconditional-money-back guarantee on a website could increase the 
probability of purchase, even though the statement has not been verified (Lee, Ang, & Dubelaar, 
2005).  Also, the fact that many organizational policies, such as delegation of authority or 
procedural justice, contribute to the creation of trust is partly due to the affective component 
inherent in these policies (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Konovsky, 2000).  These policies enhance 
the trust of staff members partly because they feel they are respected by the organization 
(Whiteneret al., 1998).  It means that by appealing to a trustor’s feeling, a trustee might look 
more trustworthy than others.  Elsbach (2004) has further proposed that a person can polish 
others’ perception of his or her trustworthiness through appropriate self-disclosure, choice of 
language and facial expressions.    Moreover, in a qualitative study of physician-patient 
relationships, researchers have discovered that physicians’ dispositions do impact on a patient’s 
inclination to trust (Cook, Kramer, Thom, Stepanikova, Mollborn, & Cooper, 2004).   Patients 
tend to place more trust in physicians who exhibit eye-contact or attentive listening than in other 
physicians who do not.   This indicates that a person may polish his or her image of 
trustworthiness through sensitively selecting facial expression or body language. 
Perhaps the counseling literature has shown the most striking evidence that a person can 
garner trust from others before actual incidents of ability, integrity and benevolence become 
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apparent.  Lee, Uhlemann, & Haase (1985) have shown that from the clients’ standpoint, 
counselors’ facial expression, head nod, voice, gesture, smile, speech, posture and eye-contact 
account for fifty-five percentage of the variance in their trustworthiness rating.  Another study 
has also discovered that clients give more favorable ratings to a counselor who exhibits high 
levels of eye-contact, direct body orientation, and learning forward (Fretz, Corn, Tuemmler, & 
Bellet, 1979).  Furthermore, the time period during which clients form the trust opinion is 
relatively short and it ranges from only ten to twenty minutes (Lee et al., 1985; Fretz et al., 1979). 
Hypotheses 
The main interest of this paper is to explain the interaction between a person’s EI and 
others’ perception of his or her trustworthiness through the application of social exchange theory 
(Blau, 1964) and the affect-infusion model (Forgas, 1995).  Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) 
predicts that in the beginning of a relationship, a person can demonstrate his or her 
trustworthiness by catching non-verbal signals and responding appropriately.  High-EI 
individuals are those who are sensitive to emotional clues underlying non-verbal signals.  They 
are also more competent than low-EI individuals in understanding the signals and displaying 
appropriate facial expression.  Accordingly, they have a better chance than low-EI individuals in 
projecting a trustworthy image on others.  The affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995), on the other 
hand, provides the link between affects and judgment. An individual will judge an unknown 
person’s trustworthiness through affect-infused strategies such as heuristic or substantive-
processing.  High-EI individuals are those who are well-versed in managing others’ emotional 
state; therefore, they are better equipped than low-EI individuals to influence another person’s 
formation of judgment of trustworthiness during the affect-infused stage of processing.  These 
could be the reasons why counselors who demonstrate gestures such as a head nod, a smile and 
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eye-contact attract more trust from clients than those who do not (Fretz et al., 1979; Lee et al., 
1985). 
We are going to describe in detail how EI can affect each of the perceptions of 
trustworthiness: ability, benevolence and integrity.  According to Mayer et al. (1995), ability is 
defined as a group of skills that a person possesses in a specific domain, which is the same as 
competence in one of Bulter’s (1991) ten conditions.  A supervisor’s group of skills, for example, 
could be difficult for a new employee to assess accurately.    The new employee may then seek 
other clues.  One of them could be his or her supervisor’s confidence at work.  A physician’s 
display of confidence when expressing medical opinions has been considered by patients as a 
clue about his or her competence (Cook et al., 2004).   Similarly, when a supervisor faces a crisis 
but is able to remain calm and composed in dealing with the task at hand, it might project an 
image of confidence.  This image of confidence might in turn varnish others’ perceptions of his 
or her ability.  In fact, even under normal conditions, a person probably needs to overcome 
anxiety and fear in order to demonstrate his or her ability confidently in the face of strangers. 
High-EI individuals are those who are highly aware and good at understanding and managing 
negative feelings. They are therefore more likely than low-EI individuals to display confidence.   
Alternatively, a subordinate’s current state of moods and emotions may also have impact 
on his or her judgment of the supervisor’s ability because of affect-infused strategies adopted at 
the early stage of a relationship.  Under this condition, if the supervisor is able to acknowledge 
the affective state of his or her subordinate, understand the causes, and change his or her mood 
from negative to neutral or even positive, it is likely that the subordinate’s perception of the 
supervisor’s ability will be improved.  In fact, a similar actual case has been described by Caruso 
et al., (2006).  Here, a manager had noticed her new subordinate’s discomfort by observing his 
facial expression, quavering tone, and nervous tapping of fingers.  She then discussed with him 
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and pinpointed the reasons behind the nervousness and pacified his anxiety.  Therefore, our first 
hypothesis is: 
H1a: A high-EI person is more likely than a low-EI person to be perceived as competent 
when others possess little information and evaluation about him or her. 
As the relationship progresses, people will nonetheless change their way of forming 
trustworthy perceptions.  Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) forecasts that as more social 
exchanges take place, people will view the other party’s trustworthiness based on how well the 
other party has reacted to signals in the past.  The affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995) 
alternatively suggests that people’s strategy of making judgment of trustworthiness shifts from 
heuristic or substantive processing to direct access processing as more information about the 
target person is revealed.  In other words, people tend to retrieve past experience and evaluations, 
rather than other clues, to form a judgment about another person’s trustworthiness.  The 
judgment process becomes quick and is seldom influenced by their affective status.  In the trust 
literatures, it has been described that people’s perceptions of trustworthiness will eventually 
depend on the actual behavioral exchanges and incidents of trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995; 
McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Jones & George, 1998; Gill et al., 2005).  At this 
stage, it seems that a high-EI individual does not have much advantage over a low-EI individual 
to change another persons’ judgment concerning him or her.   
Accordingly, we propose that people will form a perception of another person’s ability 
based more on facts than based on feelings when more information is unveiled.  For example, 
after certain periods, a subordinate may accumulate, directly or indirectly, more knowledge 
about his or her supervisor’s true abilities. He or she will then adjust his or her initial trust with 
regard to the updated information.  Therefore, our second hypothesis is: 
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H1b: As more information and experience about the other person is obtained, one will 
judge the other person’s ability based on the information and experience, independent of EI.   
Integrity means that a trustor believes that another party will adhere to a set of principles 
that the trustor finds acceptable (Mayer et al., 1995).  The definition encompasses five conditions 
proposed by Butler (1991): consistency, promise fulfillment, fairness, discreetness and integrity.  
Nonetheless, it will be very difficult to find out what principles a trustee will adhere to at the 
very beginning of a relationship.  Hoping to discover leakages about another party’s seriousness 
or laxity concerning certain principles, a trustor might search clues such as tone, voice or facial 
expression from the other party.   These leakages might then constitute an initial perception of 
integrity.  Knowing the importance of the initial perception, a high-EI individual might be more 
careful in expressing his or her emotions.  Also, the ability to perceive and understand emotions 
enables a high EI individual to be more alert to others’ expression of doubts and the ability to 
manage others’ emotions assists him or her to handle the doubts adeptly.  For example, high-EI 
individuals may be better than low-EI individuals in stipulating a promise with determination 
and in clarifying when the other party shows perplexity. Therefore, our first hypothesis 
concerning the perception of integrity is as follows: 
H2a: A high-EI person is more likely than a low-EI person to be perceived as a person of 
integrity when others possess little information and evaluations about him or her. 
However, the initial assessment of integrity formed is unlikely to last.  Additional 
information is likely to be treated as a test for the initial assessment; that is, people might adjust 
the initial assessment upwards or downwards based on the other party’s behaviors.  Gradually, 
actual behaviors will displace the initial assessment and constitute the foundation of a new 
perception. At this point, the new perception is unlikely to be influenced by another person’s EI.  
Consequently, we have the following hypothesis concerning the perception of integrity. 
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H2b: As more information and experience about the other person is revealed, one will 
judge the other person’s integrity based on the information and experience, independent of EI.   
Benevolence has been defined as a trustee’s intention to do good to a trustor, without 
egocentric profit incentive (Mayer et al., 1995).  This definition comprises four of Butler’s (1991) 
ten conditions: loyalty, openness, receptivity and availability.  In other words, the trustor 
believes that the kindness shown by the trustee is intrinsically motivated, rather than out of 
extrinsic rewards (Johnson & Grayson, 2005).  To judge whether a complete stranger’s kindness 
is intrinsically or extrinsically motivated is never easy.   Under uncertainty, one may form a 
judgment simply relying on the atmosphere that surrounds an interaction.  The atmosphere is 
more likely to be amiable when one can feel the other party’s empathy and care.  Empathy has 
been found to be significantly and positively related to one’s EI (Schutte, et al., 2001; Mayer, 
Caruso, & Salovey, 2007), possibly due to a high-EI individual’s ability to identify and 
understand emotions.  Also, high-EI employees have been found to be more altrusic than low-EI 
employees in the eyes of their supervisors (Carmeli & Josman, 2006).  Therefore, our hypothesis 
concerning EI and benevolence is: 
H3a: A high-EI person is more likely than a low-EI person to be perceived as a person of 
benevolence when others possess little information and evaluations about him or her. 
Similar to the cases of ability and integrity, we predict that the importance of empathy on 
the perception of benevolence will fade when more information becomes available.  This could 
be due to two reasons.  First, an individual will shift his or her decision making strategy from 
heuristic or substantive processing to direct access; the same as in the cases of ability and 
integrity.  Second, if additional information reveals that the trustee is not as benevolent as an 
individual originally thought, the individual’s feeling will be hurt and the bitter feeling may 
offset the original favorable feelings.  Therefore, our last hypothesis is: 
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H3b: As more information and experience about the other person is obtained, one will 
judge the other person’s benevolence based on the information and experience, independent of 
EI.  
Method 
Participants 
Thirty business school students from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business 
Administration (NHH) were recruited as participants.  Of these, six students were given the role 
of actors, while the other twenty-four were given the role of assessors.  Actors were given 
instructions on how to play the games and each actor would be assigned to play against ten to 
twelve assessors on different days and times.  Assessors played the games as strangers and 
assessed the trustworthiness of actors.  Three of the six actors had taken the MSCEIT, which is 
an online EI test that adopts the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso ability-EI model (Mayer, Salovey, & 
Caruso, 2002), before the experiment was held and the other three took the MSCEIT online after 
completion of the experiment.  Of the six actors, two were female and four were male.  Their 
average age was 23.17.  Of the twenty-four assessors, nine were female and fifteen were male.  
Their average age was 23.13.  All assessors and actors were debriefed about their roles after the 
end of the experiment. 
Materials 
MSCEIT 
We used the online version of MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 2002) for this study.  It consists of 
four EI branches and each branch has two different tasks.  The four EI branches include 
perceiving emotions, facilitating thoughts, understanding emotions and managing emotions.  
Their respective split-half reliabilities reported in the manual (Mayer et al., 2002) are r =.91, r 
=.79, r =.80 and r =.83.  The overall reliability for total EI is r =.93. 
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Experimental condition 1 – Hypothesis 1a 
This paper-based game contains two parts.  In the first part there is a Sukodu game together 
with the rules of play.  In the second part there is a question asking the players to rate how much 
each of them believes the other party can finish another Sukodu game within three minutes (11 
points Likert-type scale; 0 means not believe; 10 means strongly believe), provided with the 
information that in general fifty percent of people can finish it within three minutes.  Another 
much easier Sukodu game is then followed. 
Experimental condition 2 – Hypothesis 1b 
This paper-based game contains three parts.  It is the same as the game in experimental 
condition 1 except that the stimulus is inserted between the first and the second part.  The 
stimulus consists of a Sukodu game which is easier than that of the first part but more difficult 
than that of the last part.  The stimulus is intended to give the player more information about the 
other party’s ability. 
Experimental condition 3 – Hypothesis 2a 
This paper-based game contains two parts.  The first part requests the two players to make 
an agreement on how much they will share with each other if one of them becomes the winner of 
the Kr.1000 lucky draw.  In the second part there are questions asking each player to state 
whether he or she will honor the agreement and to rate how much he or she believes the other 
party will honor the agreement in part 1 (11 points Likert-type scale; 0 means not believe; 10 
means strongly believe). 
Experimental condition 4 – Hypothesis 2b 
This paper-based game contains three parts.  It is the same as the game in experimental 
condition 3 except that the stimulus is inserted between the first and the second part.  The 
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stimulus consists of a ten-time prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG).  The stimulus is intended to 
give the player more information about the other party’s behaviors. 
Experimental condition 5 – Hypothesis 3a 
This paper-based game contains two parts.  The first part requests the two players to state 
how they would spend Kr.500 000 if someone gives it to each of them and requires each of them 
to spend the whole sum within one week.  In the second part they are informed that one-fifth of 
the participants will be chosen to give half of his or her endowment to the other party and the 
other party can choose to accept the money or return it to the original owner.  There are 
questions asking each player to state whether he or she will accept the money if the other party is 
chosen and to rate how much he or she, if chosen, believes the other party will return the money 
(11 points Likert-type scale; 0 means not believe; 10 means strongly believe). 
Experimental condition 6 – Hypothesis 3b 
This paper-based game contains three parts.  It is the same as the game in experimental 
condition 5 except that the stimulus is inserted between the first and the second part.  The 
stimulus consists of a ten-time prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) which is the same as in 
experimental condition 4.  The stimulus is intended to give the player more information about the 
other party’s behaviors. 
Procedures 
Actors were given briefing sessions on how they should play each game one week before 
the experiment was actually to take place.  They were also given the names of the assessors in 
order to ensure they would not play against someone they had already known.   During the 
games, the actors were told to pretend to be other assessors and not to disclose their true 
identities as actors.  Except for some specific instructions that we mention in the following 
sections, they were told to behave as naturally as possible. 
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Assessors were randomly assigned to one of the two equal-sized groups.  Group one would 
play experimental conditions 1, 3 and 5, in which no stimuli would be given.  Group two would 
play experimental conditions 2, 4 and 6, in which the stimuli were included.  Each assessor 
would not play against an actor more than once.  
Experimental condition 1 
Both the assessor and the actor were asked to complete the first part within five minutes.  
They were told that it would not be possible to complete the Sudoku game and what they should 
do was to learn the rules by discussing them with each other.  After five minutes, they were 
separated and were unable to see each other.  They were then presented with the second part that 
requested them to answer the question concerning their judgment of the other party.  After the 
question was answered and the questionnaire was collected, they were required to complete the 
easier Sudoku game.  Neither the answer of each party nor the result of the latter game was 
disclosed to the other party. 
Experimental condition 2 
The steps were the same as those in experimental condition 1 except that the stimulus was 
added.  In the stimulus part the actor had been instructed in the briefing to fill in two boxes only 
in order to give an impression of below-average ability.  The players were allowed to see how 
the other party performed under this stimulus part before they continued to answer the judgment 
question.  
Experimental condition 3 
Both the assessor and the actor were asked to complete the first part in about ten minutes.  
They were told that they needed to share at least ten percent with another party.  After five 
minutes, they were asked if they needed more time to reach agreement; if yes, they were given 
another five minutes.  The actor had been instructed in the briefing to agree with the other party’s 
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suggestion, and if the other party did not make any suggestion, the actor would propose thirty 
percent.  After the first part, they were separated and were unable to see each other.  They were 
then requested to complete the second part and were informed that their answers would not be 
shared with their opponents.  They were also assured that the identity of the one who finally won 
the lucky draw would not be revealed. 
Experimental condition 4 
The steps were the same as those in experimental condition 3 except the inclusion of ten 
PDGs.  In this stimulus part, they were told that they could get an extra bonus if they cooperated 
nine times out of ten, and the bonus amount would be doubled if, for at least one game, one of 
them did not cooperate but the other party did.  The amount of bonus, however, was not stated. 
In the briefing, the actor had been instructed to cooperate until the tenth game in which the actor 
was instructed to choose not to cooperate.  For the first nine games, the actor had been instructed 
to cooperate unless the opponent chose the opposite.  When the opponent did not cooperate, for 
example, in the second PDG, the actor then had to choose not to cooperate in the third PDG until 
the opponent chose to cooperate again.  As a result, no one was able to get the double-bonus.  
Experimental condition 5 
Both the assessor and the actor were asked to complete the first part in about ten minutes.  
They were each given an amount of Kr.40 as initial endowment for this game.  After five 
minutes, they were asked if they needed more time to reach agreement; if yes, they were given 
another five minutes.  In the briefing, the actor had been instructed to tell the other party that ten 
percent of the Kr.500 000 would be given to a charity.  After the first part, they were separated 
and were unable to see each other.  They were then requested to complete the second part and 
they were informed that their answers would not be shared with their opponents. 
Experimental condition 6 
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The steps were the same as those in experimental condition 5 except that the stimulus of 
the ten-time PDGs was added.  All the procedures for the ten-time PDGs were the same as those 
in experimental condition 4. 
Results 
Each of the twenty-four assessors played three games and a total of seventy two 
observations were obtained.  However, four of them were invalid as the actors did not follow the 
instructions given in two games and two assessors were accidentally assigned to play the same 
actors twice.  Therefore, a total of sixty-eight valid observations were included in the analysis. 
Table 1 about here 
Hypotheses 
We first investigated the correlation between assessors’ perceptions and actors’ EI.  In 
Table 1, we discerned in the complete-stranger condition (experimental condition 1) that 
assessors’ perception of actors’ ability did not correlate significantly with actors’ EI.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1a was not supported.   In order to overcome the small sample size, we also carried 
out a non-parametric test.  We first divided the actors into two equal-sized groups: the high-EI 
and the low-EI group.  The high-EI group consisted of actors who scored more than 100 marks; 
whereas low EI group consisted of actors who scored lower than 100 marks.  According to the 
MSCEIT manual, the mean score is 100 marks (Mayer et al., 2002).  Building on this group 
division, a Mann-Whitney U test did not reveal any significant difference in the assessors’ 
perception of actors’ ability between the high-EI (Md=3.0, n=12) and the low-EI group (Md=4.5, 
n=12), U=15.5, z=-0.88, p=0.93, r=0.02 under this condition.  This again indicated that 
Hypothesis 1a was not supported. 
Focusing on Hypothesis 1b, an independent-sample t-test showed a significant difference in 
the assessors’ perception of actors’ ability between complete-stranger (experimental condition 1) 
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(M=4.08, SD=2.94) and additional-information condition (experimental condition 2) (M=1.60, 
SD=1.58), t(17)=2.52, p=0.022 (two-tailed).  The magnitude of the differences in the means 
(Mean Difference=2.48, 95% CI: .41 to 4.6) was also large (Eta Squared = 0.24).  The presence 
of more information through the additional Sudoku game significantly lowered the assessors’ 
ratings of the perception of actors’ ability.  Thus, Hypothesis 1b was supported.  We also carried 
out a non-parametric test in order to overcome the impact of a small sample size.  The Mann-
Whitney U test also showed a significant difference in the assessors’ perception of actors’ ability 
under the complete-stranger (Md=3.0, n=22) and the additional-information condition (Md=1.5, 
n=22), U=28.0, z=-2.17, p=0.03, r=0.46.  This provides additional evidence that Hypothesis 1b 
was supported. 
Concerning the actors’ integrity, we found that assessors’ perception did not correlate 
significantly with actors’ EI under the complete-stranger condition (experimental condition 3).  
Hypothesis 2a was thus not supported.  In line, the Mann-Whitney U test did not indicate any 
significant difference in the assessors’ perception of actors’ integrity between the high-EI 
(Md=8.0, n=11) and the low-EI group (Md=8.5, n=11), U=12.0, z=-0.39, p=0.70, r=1.17 under 
this condition.  On the other hand, we did receive support for Hypothesis 2b.  An independent-
sample t-test revealed a significant difference in assessors’ perception of actors’ integrity 
between the complete-stranger (experimental condition 3) (M=7.64, SD=2.46) and the 
additional-information condition (experimental condition 4) (M=4.09, SD=2.95), t(20)=3.06, 
p=0.006 (two-tailed).  Again, the magnitude of the differences in the means (Mean 
Difference=3.55, 95% CI: 1.1 to 6.0) was large (Eta Squared =0.32).  Moreover, the Mann-
Whitney U test also revealed a significant difference in assessors’ perception of actors’ integrity 
between the complete-stranger (Md=8.0, n=22) and the additional-information condition 
(Md=3.0, n=22), U=23.0, z=-2.49, p=0.01, r=0.53.   
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Relating to the actors’ benevolence, no significant correlation was found between assessors’ 
perception and actors’ EI under the complete-stranger condition (experimental condition 5).  In 
support of this finding, the Mann-Whitney U test did not indicate any significant difference in 
assessors’ perception of actors’ benevolence between the high-EI (Md=4.0, n=12) and the low-EI 
group (Md=7.0, n=12), U=12.0, z=-1.12, p=0.26, r=0.32. Therefore, Hypothesis 3a was not 
supported.  When looking at Hypothesis 3b, the difference in the assessors’ perception of actors’ 
benevolence between the complete-stranger (experimental condition 5) (M=5.75, SD=2.49) and 
the additional-information condition (experimental condition 6) (M=4.33, SD=3.39) was 
insignificant, t(22)=1.17, p=0.256.  The Mann-Whitney U test also agreed to the fact that there 
was no significant difference in assessors’ perception of actors’ benevolence between the 
complete-stranger (Md=6.5, n=24) and the additional-information condition (Md=4.0, n=24), 
U=55.0, z=-1.00, p=0.32, r=0.20.  Consequently, Hypothesis 3b was not supported.   
Additional Findings 
We continued to investigate whether the perception scores were independent of EI when 
additional information was available.  By looking at their correlations under the additional-
information conditions (experimental conditions 2, 4 and 6) (Table 1), we discovered two 
unexpected results.  First, there was a moderately significant relationship between actors’ ability 
to understand emotions and assessors’ perception of ability rating under the additional-
information condition, although the relationship between overall EI and the rating remained 
insignificant. Second, actors’ EI was found to be significantly correlated with assessors’ 
perception of actors’ benevolence under the additional-information condition.  The Mann-
Whitney U test also indicated significant difference in the assessors’ perception of actors’ 
benevolence between the high-EI (Md=2.0, n=12) and the low-EI group (Md=8.0, n=12), U=5.0, 
z=-2.05, p=0.04, r=.60 under the additional-information condition (experimental condition 6). 
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This was an explorative result because of not only the significance involved but also the 
negative relationship shown.  It meant that high EI individuals scored significantly lower than 
did low EI individuals in terms of benevolence-based trustworthiness when some negative 
information about those individuals was disclosed to the other party. 
Table 2 about here 
We then conducted a regression analysis to see how well actors’ EI scores predicted their 
benevolence-based trustworthiness at the presence of negative information (Table 2).  The model 
showed that the EI scores significantly predicted the benevolence-based trust score, F=12.52, 
p=0.005. The adjusted R squared value was .51, which indicated that 51% of the variance in 
benevolence-based trust was explained by the model.  It also showed that the coefficient of EI 
was significant (p=0.005). Assumptions of linearity, normally distributed errors, and 
uncorrelated errors were checked and met.   
Discussion 
The main purpose of this paper was to investigate a set of hypotheses aimed at clarifying 
the relationship between EI and perceptions of trustworthiness.  It was assumed that additional 
information would matter more than affects would when people form perceptions at the later 
stage of a relationship.   First, pertaining to the perception of ability, our results showed that 
overall EI scores did not have any significant impact on the perception rating under both 
experimental conditions.  Contrary to our prediction as described in hypothesis 1a, we found that 
high EI individuals did not have an advantage compared with low EI individuals in bestowing a 
competent image on another party.   On the other hand, we discovered that additional 
information significantly affected the perception rating of ability.   We therefore concluded that 
additional information did play a vital role for a person to reach a perception judgment.  In fact 
the above results conformed to the claim that perception of ability is cognitive (Clark & Payne, 
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1997; Greenberg et al., 2007), which means that the perception is formed based on trustworthy or 
untrustworthy acts, rather than one’s affective state. 
Second, pertaining to the perception of integrity, we discovered similar results.  Again, EI 
did not have any significant impact on the perception under both experimental conditions.  
However, additional information again did significantly affect the perception rating.  These 
findings also supported the claim that perception of integrity is also cognitive in nature (Clark & 
Payne, 1997; Greenberg et al., 2007).  However, there existed some subtle differences in the 
impact of additional information between perceptions of ability and of integrity.  The mean 
perception rating of integrity under a complete-stranger condition represented a moderate level 
of trust.  The mean perception rating was then reduced to a modest level of distrust, after the 
inclusion of ten PDGs.  The drop was not only significant but also shifted from the trusting 
region to the distrusting region.  This result was important in the sense that the PDGs themselves 
had little to do with the promises in the beginning of the experiment since the two parties were 
given no opportunity to discuss how to play the PDGs.   It agreed with the claim that initial trust 
is fragile (McKnight & Chervany, 2006).  The results might also be due to the fact that the ten 
PDGs arouse the risk awareness of the assessors.  Oliver & Lunt (2004) have discovered that risk 
awareness reduces the level of trust.  Overall, it implied that one may even speculate another 
party’s integrity through the latter’s unrelated actions.   
Third, pertaining to the perception of benevolence, we got a somewhat different picture.  
Although EI did not have significant impact on the perception when another party appeared to be 
a complete stranger, it did have a significant impact on the perception when more information 
was disclosed.  Another difference came from the comparison of means.  Unlike the perceptions 
of ability and integrity, here we found no significant difference between the means under two 
conditions.  Because EI did have an impact on the perception of benevolence, it seemed to 
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support the claim that benevolence is affective in nature (Clark & Payne, 1997; Greenberg et al., 
2007). This means that the perception is affected by feelings of care and concern rather than of 
hard evidence (Johnson & Grayson, 2005).  The results also concurred that affective trust tended 
to be stable (Scott III, 1980). 
Our result concerning the perception of benevolence also indicated that there was a 
significant but negative correlation between EI and perception of benevolence due to the fact that 
some negative information was given.  A negative correlation was found not only between the 
perception and overall EI, but also between the perception and all subcategories of EI, even 
though only one subcategory – ability to manage emotions - was moderately significant (Table 1). 
This result seemed to contradict previous research results which have shown that supervisors rate 
high-EI subordinates as more altruistic than low-EI subordinates (Carmeli & Josman, 2006).  
The difference, we argue, may lie in one of our experimental conditions, in which we 
deliberately added a somewhat selfish act.  We try to reconcile the difference by making the 
following proposition: EI by itself is neutral and does not strengthen or diminish the perception 
of benevolence; rather it simply serves as an “amplifier” which amplifies later signals released 
from an individual.   In other words, an individual can distinguish between high-EI and low-EI 
individuals but the distinction will affect one’s perception only after more information is 
available.  This seems to be supported by other research which has discovered that a person’s 
charismatic behavior does not earn him or her trust from others when he or she is a stranger 
(Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996).    On the one hand, when additional information signals 
benevolence, a trustor may perceive high-EI individuals as more benevolent than low-EI 
individuals.  On the other hand, when additional signals do not indicate benevolence, a trustor 
may regard the high-EI individual as Machiavellian, which means the latter party is exploitative, 
and deceitful (Hunter, Gerbing, & Boster, 1982).  Previous findings have revealed that a negative 
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relationship exists between trustworthiness and Machiavellianism (Butler, 1986; Butler, 1991).  
Moreover, those who score high in Machiavellianism are more likely to defect in a bargaining 
game (Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, & Smith, 2002).  
There was also a moderately significant relationship found between perception of ability 
ratings and ability to understand emotions when additional negative information is present.  This 
seemed logical in a sense that those who had better understanding of others’ emotions were 
regarded as having better ability than those who had not. 
We summarized our findings as follows.  Initially, EI does not contribute to any of the 
perceptions of trustworthiness.  As more information is revealed, EI is likely to have an impact 
on the perception of benevolence but not on the perceptions of ability and integrity.  The impact 
could be negative, provided that the nature of the information is negative.  On the other hand, 
information alone has a significant impact on the perceptions of ability and integrity, but not on 
the perception of benevolence. 
Practical Implications 
Our results have a number of practical implications.  First, one of our results showed that a 
person’s EI has minimal impact on all the three perceptions of trustworthiness when he or she is 
a complete stranger to another party.  It implies that substance is more important than style 
(Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996) even at the early stage of a relationship.  In other words, only 
concrete evidence of trustworthiness can weaken others’ initial suspicions and entice their trust.  
For example, a subordinate will trust their supervisors’ abilities only when they show adequate 
technical knowledge rather than merely demonstrate confidence or enthusiasm.  By the same 
token, one believes in others’ integrity only when incidents of word-action consistency are found.  
Even in the case of benevolence, the showing of empathy and concern may impress the trustees 
but will not immediately enhance others’ perceptions.  Therefore, if a team wishes to establish a 
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trust relationship with newcomers, showing track records of trustworthy acts might be more 
effective than mere demonstration of warm and caring atmosphere. 
Second, our results showed that people under uncertainty were highly sensitive to 
additional information in the case of ability or integrity based trusts, even when such information 
was not relevant to the judgment.  It implies that it is better for a company to adopt a transparent 
policy than a black-box policy when its aim is to encourage trust.  For example, when a company 
faces a redundancy decision, sometimes management teams might wish to keep the decision 
process in the dark or even denial until the very last minute in an attempt to maintain morale.  
However, our result suggests that staff members who have not had well-established trust with the 
management would try to surmise the authenticity of management’s words from clues such as 
rumors and in many cases they may overreact to these clues.  Eventually, good staff members 
whom the management wishes to retain may leave well before the announcement is made.   
Third, our result also revealed that EI may, on some occasions, be detrimental in creating a 
trust relationship.  It implies that management should not over-emphasize the importance of 
staff’s EI, especially in relation to the establishment of trust.  A high-EI manager, for example, 
might be more skillful than a low-EI manager in displaying empathy towards his or her staff.  
Nonetheless, when such empathy is not matched with actions and behaviors, he or she will be 
perceived as less benevolent than a low-EI manager who does the same.  Of course, this does not 
imply that it is better for a company to employ a low-EI manager.  It simply implies that when 
one considers trust-building, one should first emphasize an individual’s creditability of ability, 
integrity and benevolence rather than an individual’s EI.  
Limitations 
There were some limitations in our findings.  First, caution must be taken in generalizing 
the results.  Not all kinds of aspects within each perception have been taken into account in our 
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experiment.  In fact we took into account only one aspect for each perception.  For example, in 
the perception of ability we considered ability that only involved little emotional content.  For 
those abilities that comprise considerable emotional content, the effect of EI on the perception of 
ability might be more significant than our result showed.  As the perception of ability is domain 
specific (Mayer et al., 1995), it is simply not possible to test all kinds of abilities in a single 
experiment.  Similarly for the perception of integrity we adopted material related only to 
honoring one’s promise but not to all principles that a trustor found acceptable.  By the same 
token, the perception of benevolence was only related to whether a person would take advantage 
of another parties’ misfortune. 
The second limitation concerns the face-to-face interaction we adopted in our experiment.  
Face-to-face interaction, some argue, offers less control than, for example, computer-mediated 
interaction does.  Although the latter can offer tight control by providing the same conditions 
across all assessors, it also severely limits an actor’s choices to respond to different assessors 
with different treatments which he or she thinks best suit the individual assessor.  The ability to 
make an appropriate choice of treatment is one of the key differences between a high-EI 
individual and a low-EI individual.  High-EI individuals are regarded as better than low-EI 
individuals in affecting another party’s formation of perception through subtle demonstration of 
one’s own facial expression, tone or gestures.  In order to keep this ability intact, we nonetheless 
chose face-to-face interaction.  In fact, when Yamagishi (2001) conducted an experiment by 
asking students to judge whether the other party would cooperate in a prisoners’ dilemma game, 
he allowed students to have a thirty-minute face-to-face discussion session in advance of the 
game. 
The third limitation relates to the performances of actors and assessors.  As each actor 
played ten to twelve games and each assessor played three games, it might be argued that actors’ 
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performance could be affected by doing mundane tasks and assessors’ performance could be 
influenced by learning effects.  While we could not rule out such influences, we took several 
actions to minimize the impacts.  First, each actor played only three to four games - normally 
different games - in a row with a break of ten to fifteen minutes inserted between different 
assessors.  After three or four games the actor would play against other assessors which took 
place an hour to a few days later.  This arrangement was intended to minimize the boredom felt 
by actors.  Second, each assessor played three games but not everyone played in the same 
sequence.  The order was counterbalanced.  By manipulating the sequence of playing, we 
averaged out the learning effects upon the results. 
Future Research 
First, our result showed that EI might serve as an “amplifier” of information pertaining to 
benevolence.  This needs to be investigated further as our experiment took into account 
information of negative nature only.  Second, we found that EI offered negligible impact on 
perceptions of trustworthiness under uncertainty.  However, it is still unclear whether such an 
impact remains trivial across the whole trust-building process.  For example, Jones & George 
(1998) have claimed that emotion serves as a signal that incites a reappraisal of a trust 
relationship and an emotional outburst will be likely to dissolve a trust bond.  High-EI 
individuals might be better than low-EI individuals in consciously monitoring emotional signals 
so that the reach of the outburst point could be avoided.  Therefore, future research that looks at 
the impact of EI on trust-building process at different stages is recommended.  
Conclusions 
We hypothesized that EI would be positively related to each of the perceptions of trust: 
ability, integrity and benevolence.  Moreover, we hypothesized that all the perceptions would be 
significantly affected when additional information is revealed.    However, our results showed 
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that there was no significant relationship between an individual’s EI and his or her own 
trustworthiness in terms of ability, integrity and benevolence at the very early stage.  On the 
contrary, we did find people to be highly sensitive to additional clues about an individual’s 
trustworthiness in terms of ability and integrity, but not of benevolence.  Additionally, our results 
pointed out that EI might even be counterproductive in benevolence-based trust if inconsistency 
between words and actions was present. 
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Table 1 
Correlations between Perception Scores and Emotional Intelligence Scores 
 
 
 
Experimental conditions 
Actors’ 
overall 
emotional 
intelligence 
Actors’ ability 
to recognize 
emotions 
Actors’ ability 
to use 
emotions  
Actors’ ability 
to understand 
emotions 
Actors’ ability 
to manage 
emotions 
1. Assessors’ perception of actors’ ability without 
additional information 
-0.008 0.074 0.229 -0.284 -0.064 
2. Assessors’ perception of actors’ ability with additional 
information 
0.451 0.167 -0.120 0.730b 0.252 
3. Assessors’ perception of actors’ integrity without 
additional information 
0.341 0.510 0.378 0.098 0.044 
4. Assessors’ perception of actors’ integrity with additional 
information 
0.275 0.372 0.136 0.185 -0.114 
5. Assessors’ perception of actors’ benevolence without 
additional information 
-0.254 -0.362 0.321 -0.437 0.009 
6. Assessors’ perception of actors’ benevolence with 
additional information 
-0.746a -0.337 -0.597b -0.442 -0.245 
  a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  b Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 2 
Emotional Intelligence as a Predictor of Benevolence Perception under Additional Negative 
Information 
Regression Model Adjusted 
R2 
F-value DF Beta t-value Signifi-
cance 
Dependent variable: perception 
score of benevolence 
- - - - - - 
Emotional intelligence 0.512 12.524a 11 0.746 -3.539 0.005 
  a Significant at p < 0.01 level. 
 
 
